Chicken and game theory
A formal
version of the game of chicken has been the subject of
serious research in
game theory.
Because the "loss" of swerving is so trivial compared to
the crash that occurs if nobody swerves, the reasonable
strategy would seem to be to swerve before a crash is
likely. Yet, knowing this, if one believes one's
opponent to be reasonable, one may well decide not to
swerve at all, in the belief that he will be reasonable
and decide to swerve, leaving the other player the
winner. This unstable strategy can be formalized by
saying there is more than one Nash equilibrium for the
game, a Nash equilibrium being a pair of strategies for
which neither player gains by changing his own strategy
while the other stays the same. (In this case, the
equilibria are the two situations wherein one player
swerves while the other does not.)
One tactic in the
game is for one party to signal their intentions
convincingly before the game begins. For example, if one
party were to ostentatiously disable their steering
wheel just before the match, the other party would be
compelled to swerve. This shows that, in some
circumstances, reducing one's own options can be a good
strategy. One real-world example is a protester who
handcuffs himself to an object, so that no threat can be
made which would compel him to move (since he cannot
move).
The payoff matrix
for the game of chicken looks like this:
-
| |
Swerving |
Driving
straight |
| Swerving |
0, 0 |
-1, +1 |
| Driving
straight |
+1, -1 |
-20,
-20 |
Of course, this
model assumes that one chooses one's strategy before
playing and sticks to it - an unrealistic assumption,
since if a player sees the other swerving early, he can
drive straight, no matter what his earlier plans.
This model also
assumes that, if both parties swerve, they will not
swerve in the same direction.
Under this model,
and in contrast to the prisoner's dilemma, where one
action is always best, in the game of chicken one wants
to do the opposite of whatever the other player is
doing.
Chicken and the
prisoner's dilemma
In chicken,
if your opponent cooperates (swerves), you are better
off to defect (drive straight) - this is your best
possible outcome. If your opponent defects, you are
better off to cooperate. Mutual defection is the worst
possible outcome (hence unstable), but in the
prisoner's dilemma
the worst possible outcome is cooperating while the
other player defects, and mutual defection is stable. In
both games, mutual cooperation is unstable.